Making More Sense of Retributivism: Desert as Responsibility and Proportionality

Philosophy

Volumn 78, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 279-287

  Corlett, J Angelo ^a  

^a SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84867825059     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819103000287     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. J. Angelo Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ Philosophy, 76 (2001), pp. 77–110.
2. John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules,’ The Philosophical Review, 64 (1955), pp. 3–13. Reprinted in
3. John Rawls, Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 20–46.
4. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, John Ladd, Translator (London: The Macmillan Publishing Company, 1965), p. 100;
5. The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 105, emphasis added. Quoted in
6. Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ p. 86.
7. Thom Brooks, ‘Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution,’ Philosophy, 76 (2001), pp. 561–580.
8. Brooks, ‘Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution,’ p. 561.
9. Brooks is aware of Murphyʼns important article on the problem of attributing a theory of punishment to Kant, as he cites it at Brooks, ‘Corlett on Kant, Hegel and Retribution,’ p. 569.
10. Jeffrie G. Murphy, ‘Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?’ Columbia Law Review, 87 (1987), pp. 509–532. Also see,
11. J. Angelo Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), Chapter 4.
12. Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment, Chapter 4.
13. Murphy, ‘Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?’
14. See also J. Angelo Corlett, ‘Foundations of a Kantian Theory of Punishment,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 31 (1993), pp. 263–284.
15. Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment, Chapter 4.
16. Brooks, ‘Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution,’ p. 566.
17. Brooks, ‘Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution,’ p. 566.
18. Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ p. 80, footnote 11.
19. Brooks, ‘Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution,’ pp. 561, 580.
20. Brooks, ‘Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution,’ p. 578.
21. As Rawls himself seems to do in his adopting the requirements of guilt and proportionality for punishment in articulating his brand of rule-utilitarianism. For while Jeremy Bentham spends a great deal of philosophical energy articulating utilitarian reasons for proportional punishment [Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York; Hafner Press, 1948), pp. 178-88], Kant and retributivists in general have long held these two principles of punishment as foundational to their versions of retributivism.