Outside directors, board interlocks and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups

Journal of Economics and Business

Volumn 63, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 251-277

  Pombo, Carlos ^a   Gutiérrez, Luis H ^b  

^a Universidad de los Andes   (Colombia)

^b UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO   (Colombia)

Author keywords

Board interlocks; Busy directors; Colombian corporations; Control contestability; Corporate governance; Firm performance; Outside directors

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955953872     PISSN: 01486195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2011.01.002     Document Type: Article

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