A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups

Journal of Finance

Volumn 61, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 2637-2680

  Almeida, Heitor V ^a   Wolfenzon, Daniel ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744812200     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01001.x     Document Type: Article

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