The contest to the control in European family firms: How other shareholders affect firm value

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 146-159

  Jara Bertin, Mauricio ^a   López Iturriaga, Félix J ^a   López De Foronda, Óscar ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALLADOLID   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BURGOS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Corporate control; Corporate governance; Family firms; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 49749092299     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00677.x     Document Type: Article

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