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Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 173-190

Altruistic Punishment and Between-Group Competition: Evidence from n-person Prisoner's Dilemmas

Author keywords

Collective action; Cultural group selection; Evolution; Punishment

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; COOPERATION; GAME; GROUP PROCESS; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; PILOT STUDY; PUNISHMENT;

EID: 84863303928     PISSN: 10456767     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12110-012-9136-x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (13)

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