Confusion of group interest and self-interest in parochial cooperation on behalf of a group

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 283-295

  Baron, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035354429     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045003002     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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