Erratum to "Punishing free riders: direct and indirect promotion of cooperation". [Evolution and Human Behavior 28 (2007) 330-339] (DOI:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.04.001);Punishing free riders: direct and indirect promotion of cooperation

Evolution and Human Behavior

Volumn 28, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 330-339

  Shinada, Mizuho ^a,b   Yamagishi, Toshio ^a  

^a HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b JAPAN SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF SCIENCE   (Japan)

Author keywords

Conditional cooperation; Cooperation; Expectation; Prisoner's dilemma; Punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547838938     PISSN: 10905138     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.003     Document Type: Erratum

References (52)

1. Aoki M. Toward a comparative institutional analysis (2001), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
2. Anderson C.M., and Putterman L. Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior 54 (2006) 1-24
3. Andreoni J., and Miller J.H. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: Experimental evidence. Economic Journal 103 (1993) 570-585
4. Andreoni J., and Petrie R. Public goods experiments without confidentiality: A glimpse into fund-raising. Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004) 1605-1623
5. Bewley T. Why wages don't fall in a recession (1999), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
6. Blau P.M. Exchange and power in social life (1964), John Wiley & Sons, New York
7. Boehm C. Hierarchy in the forest: The evolution of egalitarian behavior (1999), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
8. Boyd R., Gintis H., Bowles S., and Richerson P.J. The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 100 (2003) 3531-3535
9. Boyd R., and Richerson P.J. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology, 13 (1992) 171-195
10. Casari M., and Plott C.R. Decentralized management of common property resources: Experiments with a centuries-old institution. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51 (2003) 217-247
11. Charness G., and Dufwenberg M. Promises and partnership. Econometrica, 74 (2006) 1579-1601
12. Cho K., and Choi B. A cross-society study of trust and reciprocity: Korea, Japan, and the US. International Studies Review, 3 (2000) 31-43
13. Clark K., and Sefton M. The sequential prisoner's dilemma: Evidence on reciprocation. Economic Journal, 111 (2001) 51-68
14. Dawes R.M. Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31 (1980) 169-193
15. Dietz T., Ostrom E., and Stern P.C. The struggle to govern the commons. Science, 302 (2003) 1907-1912
16. Eek D., Loukopoulos P., Fujii S., and Garling T. Spill-over effects of intermittent costs for defection in social dilemmas. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32 (2002) 801-813
17. Falk A., Fehr E., and Fischbacher U. Driving forces of informal sanctions. Econometrica, 73 (2005) 2017-2030
18. Fehr E., and Fischbacher U. The nature of human altruism-Proximate patterns and evolutionary origins. Nature, 425 (2003) 785-791
19. Fehr E., and Gächter S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415 (2002) 137-140
20. Fischbacher U., Gächter S., and Fehr E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters, 71 (2001) 397-404
21. Gardner R., Ostrom E., and Walker J. The nature of common-pool resource problems. Rationality and Society, 2 (1990) 335-358
22. Hamilton W.D. The genetical evolution of social behaviour I. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7 (1964) 1-52
23. Hardin G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162 (1968) 1243-1248
24. Hayashi N., Ostrom E., Walker J., and Yamagishi T. Reciprocity, trust, and the sense of control: A cross-societal study. Rationality and Society, 11 (1999) 27-46
25. Henrich J. Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 53 (2004) 3-35
26. Henrich J., and Boyd R. Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology 208 (2001) 79-89
27. Hobbes T. Leviathan (1651), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
28. Issac R.M., and Walker J.M. Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103 (1988) 179-199
29. Kavka G.S. Hobbes's war all against all. Ethics, 93 (1983) 291-310
30. Kiyonari T., Tanida S., and Yamagishi T. Social exchange and reciprocity: Confusion or a heuristic?. Evolution and Human Behavior, 21 (2000) 411-427
31. Kurzban R., and Houser D. Experiments investigating cooperative types in humans: A complement to evolutionary theory and simulations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102 (2005) 1803-1807
32. Kurzban R., McCabe K., Smith V.L., and Wilson B.J. Incremental commitment and reciprocity in a real time public goods game. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27 (2001) 1662-1673
33. Loukopoulos P., Eek D., Garling T., and Fujii S. Palatable punishment in real-world social dilemmas?. Journal of Applied Psychology, 36 (2006) 1274-1279
34. Marwell G., and Ames R. Experiments in the provision of public goods: I. Resources, interest, group size and the free rider problem. American Journal of Sociology, 84 (1979) 1335-1360
35. Masclet D., Noussair C., Tucker S., and Villeval M. Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. American Economic Review, 93 (2003) 366-380
36. Noussair C., and Tucker S. Combining monetary and social sanctions to promote cooperation. Economic Inquiry, 43 (2005) 649-660
37. Oliver P. Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: Theoretical investigations. American Journal of Sociology, 85 (1980) 1356-1375
38. Olson M. The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups (1965), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
39. Orbell J., Dawes R.M., and Van de Kragt A. Explaining discussion induced cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social Pyschology, 54 (1988) 811-819
40. Ostrom E., Walker J., and Gardner R. Covenants with and without a sword: Self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review, 86 (1992) 404-417
41. Page T., Putterman L., and Unel B. Voluntary association in public goods experiments: Reciprocity, mimicry and efficiency. Economic Journal, 115 (2005) 1032-1053
42. Price M.E., Cosmides L., and Tooby J. Punitive sentiment as an anti-free rider psychological device. Evolution and Human Behavior, 23 (2002) 203-231
43. Pruitt D.G., and Kimmel M.J. Twenty years of experimental gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual Review of Psychology, 28 (1977) 363-392
44. Rapoport A. Research paradigms and expected utility models for the provision of public goods. Psychological Review, 94 (1987) 74-83
45. Sober E., and Wilson D.S. Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior (1998), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
46. Taylor M. Anarchy and cooperation (1976), Wiley, New York
47. Trivers R. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46 (1971) 35-57
48. Walker J., and Halloran M.A. Rewards and sanctions and the provision of public goods in one-shot settings. Experimental Economics 7 (2004) 235-247
49. Watabe M., Terai S., Hayashi N., and Yamagishi T. Cooperation in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma based on expectations ofreciprocity. Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36 (1996) 183-196
50. Yamagishi T. The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (1986) 110-116
51. Yamagishi T. Seriousness of social dilemmas and the provision of a sanctioning system. Social Psychology Quarterly, 51 (1988) 32-42
52. Yamagishi T. Group size and the provision of a sanctioning system in a social dilemma. In: W. B. G. L., D. M. M., and H. W. (Eds). Social dilemma: Theoretical issues and research findings (pp.267-287) (1992), Pergamon Press, Oxford, UK