The German political business cycle: Money demand rather than monetary policy

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 609-631

  Berger, Helge ^a   Woitek, Ulrich ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bundesbank; Central bank; E32; E58; E63; Electoral uncertainty; Germany; Monetary policy; Money demand; Political business cycles

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001615868     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00048-9     Document Type: Article

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