How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 807-821

  Berger, Helge ^a   Woitek, Ulrich ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bundesbank; Central bank; E32; E58; E63; Political business cycles

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031443281     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00036-0     Document Type: Article

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