Politics and monetary policy

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 93, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 941-960

  Ehrmann, Michael ^a   Fratzscher, Marcel ^a  

^a EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053966360     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: 15309142     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00113     Document Type: Article

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