The political economy of exchange rate regimes in developed and developing countries

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 38-53

  Berdiev, Aziz N ^a   Kim, Yoonbai ^b   Chang, Chun Ping ^c  

^a BRYANT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

^c SHIH CHIEN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Exchange rate regimes; Panel multinomial logit model; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855202200     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.06.007     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Querubin P., Robinson J. When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence. NBER Working Paper 14033 2008.
2. Alesina A. Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1987, 102:651-678.
3. Alvarez M., Cheibub J., Limongi F., Przewroski A. Classifying political regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development 1996, 31:3-36.
4. Arnone M., Laurens B., Segalotto J., Sommer M. Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends. IMF Working Paper WP/07/88 2007.
5. Baltagi B.H. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data 1995, John Wiley & Sons, New York.
6. Beck T., Clarke G., Groff A., Keefer P., Walsh P. New tools in comparative political economy: the database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review 2001, 15:165-176.
7. Benoit K., Laver M. Party Policy in Modern Democracies 2006, Routledge, London.
8. Berger H., Nitsch V., Lybek T. Central bank boards around the world: why does membership size differ?. European Journal of Political Economy 2008, 24:817-832.
9. Bernhard W., Leblang D. Democratic institutions and exchange-rate commitments. International Organization 1999, 53:71-97.
10. Bernhard W., Leblang D. Political parties and monetary commitments. International Organization 2002, 56:803-830.
11. Bjørnskov C. Does political ideology affect economic growth?. Public Choice 2005, 123:133-146.
12. Bjørnskov C. Political Ideology and Economic Freedom. Working Paper 05-8 2005, Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business.
13. Bjørnskov C. The growth-inequality association: government ideology matters. Journal of Development Economics 2008, 87:300-308.
14. Bjørnskov C., Potrafke N. Politics and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: a panel data analysis. Economics of Transition 2011, 19:201-230.
15. Bodea C. The political economy of fixed exchange rate regimes: the experience of post-communist countries. European Journal of Political Economy 2010, 26:248-264.
16. Bortolotti B., Pinotti P. Delayed privatization. Public Choice 2008, 136:331-351.
17. Bortolotti B., Fantini M., Siniscalco D. Privatisation around the world: evidence from panel data. Journal of Public Economics 2003, 88:305-332.
18. Broz J.L. Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes. International Organization 2002, 56:861-868.
19. Broz J.L., Frieden J. The political economy of international monetary relations. Annual Review of Political Science 2001, 4:317-343.
20. Broz J.L., Frieden J., Weymouth S. Exchange rate policy attitudes: direct evidence from survey data. IMF Staff Papers 2008, 55:417-444.
21. Carmignani F., Colombo E., Tirelli P. Exploring different views of exchange rate regime choice. Journal of International Money and Finance 2008, 27:1177-1197.
22. Cheibub J., Gandhi J., Vreeland J. Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice 2010, 143:67-101.
23. Clark W., Reichert U., Lomas S., Parker K. International and domestic constraints on political business cycles in OECD economies. International Organization 1998, 52:87-120.
24. Crowe C. Goal independent central banks: why politicians decide to delegate. European Journal of Political Economy 2008, 24:748-762.
25. Crowe C., Meade E. Central bank independence and transparency: evolution and effectiveness. European Journal of Political Economy 2008, 24:763-777.
26. Cukierman A. Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions - past, present and future. European Journal of Political Economy 2008, 24:722-736.
27. Cukierman A., Tommasi M. When does it take a Nixon to go to China?. American Economic Review 1998, 88:180-197.
28. Database of Political Institutions 2010, original constructed by Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review 15, 165-176. Current version compiled by the Development Research Group of the World Bank.
29. De Haan J., Masciandaro D., Quintyn M. Does central bank independence still matter?. European Journal of Political Economy 2008, 24:717-721.
30. Dreher A. Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalization. Applied Economics 2006, 38:1091-1110.
31. Dreher A., Noel G., Pim M. Measuring Globalisation - Gauging its Consequences 2008, Springer, New York.
32. Dreher A., Sturm J., De Haan J. When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data set. Journal of Macroeconomics 2010, 32:766-781.
33. Duso T. On the Politics of Regulatory Reform: Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries. Discussion Paper FS IV 02-07 2002, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin.
34. Edwards S. Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates and Capital Controls: Some Latin American Experiences. NBER Working Paper 6800 1998.
35. Eichengreen B., Hausmann R. Original Sin: The Road to Redemption. Debt Denomination and Financial Instability in Emerging Market Economies 2005, 266-288. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. B. Eichengreen, R. Hausmann (Eds.).
36. Eichengreen B., Leblang D. Exchange rates and cohesion: historical perspectives and political-economy considerations. Journal of Common Market Studies 2003, 41:797-822.
37. Eijffinger S., De Haan J. The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence. Special Papers in International Economics No. 19 1996, International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University.
38. Eijffinger S., Hoeberichts M. The trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism in a New Keynesian framework. European Journal of Political Economy 2008, 24:742-747.
39. Fearon J. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. The American Political Science Review 1994, 88:577-592.
40. Frankel J., Rose A. Economic Structure and the Decision to Adopt a Common Currency. Seminar Paper No. 611 1996, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm, Sweden.
41. Frieden J. Globalization and Exchange Rate Policy. The Future of Globalization 2008, Routledge, New York.
42. Frieden J., Stein E. The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy in Latin America: An Analytical Overview. The Currency Game: Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America 2001, 1-20. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. J. Frieden, E. Stein (Eds.).
43. Frieden J., Leblang D., Valev N. The political economy of exchange rate regimes in transition economies. The Review of International Organizations 2010, 5:1-25.
44. Goldberg P., Pavcnik N. Distributional effects of globalization in developing countries. Journal of Economic Literature 2007, 45:39-82.
45. Grilli V., Masciandaro D., Tabellini G. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries. Economic Policy 1991, 13:341-392.
46. Hibbs D. Political parties and macroeconomic policies. The American Political Science Review 1977, 71:1467-1487.
47. Hossain M. Institutional development and the choice of exchange rate regime: a cross-country analysis. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies 2009, 23:56-70.
48. Jácome L., Vázquez F. Is there any link between legal central bank independence and inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean. European Journal of Political Economy 2008, 24:788-801.
49. Kimakova A. The political economy of exchange rate regime determination: theory and evidence. Economic System 2008, 32:354-371.
50. Klein M.W., Schambaugh J.C. Exchange Rate Regimes in the Modern Era 2010, MIT Press, Cambridge.
51. Klomp J., De Haan J. Central bank independence and financial instability. Journal of Financial Stability 2009, 5:321-338.
52. Leblang D. Political institutions and exchange rate commitments in the developing world. International Studies Quarterly 1999, 43:599-620.
53. Levy-Yeyati E., Sturzenegger F. To Float or to Trail: Evidence on the Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes. UTDT, CIF Working Paper No. 1/01 2001.
54. Levy-Yeyati E., Sturzenegger F. Classifying exchange rate regimes: deeds vs. words. European Economic Review 2005, 49:1603-1635.
55. Levy-Yeyati E., Sturzenegger F., Reggio I. On the endogeneity of exchange rate regimes. European Economic Review 2010, 54:659-677.
56. Markiewicz A. Choice of exchange rate regime in transition economies: an empirical analysis. Journal of Comparative Economics 2006, 34:484-498.
57. McKinnon R. Optimum currency areas. American Economic Review 1963, 53:717-725.
58. Milesi-Ferretti G.M. The disadvantage of tying their hands: on the political economy of policy commitments. The Economic Journal 1995, 105:1381-1402.
59. Mundell R.A. Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 1963, 29:475-485.
60. Norris P. Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens. Governance in a Globalizing World 2000, 155-177. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. J. Nye, J. Donahue (Eds.).
61. Pearce D. The political economy of an energy tax: the United Kingdom's climate change levy. Energy Economics 2006, 28:149-158.
62. Petras J., Veltmeyer H. Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century 2001, Zed Books, London.
63. Pissarides C. British government popularity and economic performance. The Economic Journal 1980, 90:569-581.
64. Pitlik H. The Impact of growth performance and political regime type on economic policy liberalization. Kyklos 2008, 61:258-278.
65. Poirson H. How Do Countries Choose Their Exchange Rate Regime?. IMF Working Paper WP/01/46 2001.
66. Potrafke N. Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries. Public Choice 2010, 143:135-155.
67. Potrafke N. Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries. Review of World Economics 2010, 146:545-571.
68. Przeworski A., Alvarez M., Cheibub J., Limongi F. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990 2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
69. Siklos P. No single definition of central bank independence is right for all countries. European Journal of Political Economy 2008, 24:802-816.
70. Simmons B., Elkins Z. The globalization of liberalization: policy diffusion in the international political economy. American Political Science Review 2004, 98:171-189.
71. So Y., Kuhfeld W. Multinomial Logit Models. Working Paper 1995.
72. Von Hagen J., Zhou J. The choice of exchange rate regime: an empirical analysis for transition economies. Economics of Transition 2005, 13:679-703.
73. Von Hagen J., Zhou J. The choice of exchange rate regimes in developing countries: a multinomial panel analysis. Journal of International Money and Finance 2007, 26:1071-1094.
74. WDI World Development Indicators 2009, World Bank, Washington D. C.
75. Wei Y., Liu B., Liu X. Entry modes of foreign direct investment in China: a multinomial logit approach. Journal of Business Research 2005, 58:1495-1505.