Fomc voting behavior and electoral cycles: Partisan ideology and partisan loyalty

Economics and Politics

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 17-32

  Mcgregor, Rob Roy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010880229     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1996.tb00118.x     Document Type: Article

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