No single definition of central bank independence is right for all countries

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 802-816

  Siklos, Pierre L ^a,b  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b Viessmann European Research Centre   (Canada)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Quantile regression

Indexed keywords

EID: 55049112653     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.004     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Acheson K., and Chant J. Bureaucratic theory and the choice of central bank goals. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 5 (1973) 637-655
2. Alesina A., and Drazen A. Why are stabilizations delayed?. American Economic Review 81 (1991) 1170-1188
3. Alesina A., and Grilli V. The European Central Bank: reshaping the monetary politics of Europe. In: Canzoneri M.B., Grilli V., and Masson P.R. (Eds). Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S. (1992), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 49-77
4. Alesina A., and Summers L. Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25 (1993) 151-162
5. Alesina A., and Rosenthal H. Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy (1995), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
6. Bade, R., Parkin, M., 1985. Central bank laws and monetary policy. Unpublished working paper. University of Western Ontario.
7. Banaian K., and Luksetich W. Central bank independence, economic freedom, and inflation rates. Economic Inquiry 39 (2001) 149-161
8. Banaian K., Burdekin R., and Willett T. The principal components of central bank independence: the more the merrier?. Public Choice 97 (1998) 1-12
9. Barro R., and Gordon D. Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (1983) 101-120
10. Bernanke B., Laubach T., Mishkin F., and Posen A. Inflation Targeting (1999), Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J
11. Borio C., and Filardo A. Globalization and inflation: new cross-country evidence on the global determinants of domestic inflation. BIS working paper 227 (2007)
12. Bouwman K., Jong-A-Pin R., and de Haan J. On the relationship between central bank independence and inflation: some more bad news. Applied Financial Economics Letters 1 (2005) 381-385
13. Blinder A. Central Banking in Theory and Practice (1998), The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass
14. Blinder, A., Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., De Haan, J., Jansen, D.-J., in press. Central bank communication and monetary policy: a survey of theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Literature.
15. Cukierman A. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence (1992), The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
16. Cukierman, A., 2008. The limits of transparency. unpublished working paper.
17. Cukierman A., Webb S., and Neyapti B. Measuring the independence of central banks and its effects on policy outcomes. The World Bank Economic Review 6 (1992) 353-398
18. Debelle G., and Fischer S. How independent should a central bank be?. In: Fuhrer J. (Ed). Goals, Guidelines, and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers, Proceedings of a conference held at North Falmouth, Massachusetts (1994), Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Mass. 195-221
19. Drazen A. Political Economy in Macroeconomics (2000), Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J
20. Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., de Haan, J., 2007. When is a central banker fired? evidence based on a new data set. Unpublished working paper.
21. Edwards S. Capital flows, capital contractions, and macroeconomic vulnerability. Journal of International Money and Finance 26 (2007) 814-840
22. Eijffinger S., and De Haan J. The political economy of central bank independence. Special Papers in International Economics, no. 19 (1996), Princeton University, Department of Economics, International Finance Section, Princeton, N.J.
23. Eijffinger S., van Rooij M., and Schaling E. Central bank independence: a panel data approach. Public Choice 89 (1996) 163-182
24. Forder J. Interests and 'independence': the European central bank and the theory of bureaucracy. International Review of Applied Economics 16 (2002) 51-69
25. Forder J. Why is central bank independence so widely approved?. Journal of Economic Issues 39 (2005) 843-865
26. Frankel, Jeffrey, 1999. No Single Currency Regime is Right For All Countries or At All Times. NBER Working Paper 7338.
27. Friedman M. The quantity theory of money, a restatement. In: Friedman M. (Ed). Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (1956), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. 3-21
28. Goodhart C. The Central Bank and The Financial System (1995), The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass
29. Goodhart C. Central bankers and uncertainty. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (1999) 102-121 February
30. Greenspan A. The Age of Turbulence (2007), Penguin, New York
31. Grilli V., Masciandaro D., and Tabellini G. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries. Economic Policy 6 (1991) 342-392
32. Havrilesky T. The Pressures on American Monetary Policy (1993), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
33. Hayo, B., Hefeker, K., 2008. Does central bank independence cause low inflation? a skeptical view. Unpublished working paper.
34. Johnson D., and Siklos P. Political and economic determinants of interest rate behavior: are central banks different?. Economic Inquiry 34 (1996) 708-729
35. Koenker R. Quantile Regression (2005), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass
36. Kydland F., and Prescott E. Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy 85 (1977) 473-492
37. Levy-Yeyati E., and Sturzenegger F. Classifying exchange rate regimes: deeds versus words. European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1603-1635
38. Morris J., and Lybek T. Central bank governance: a survey of boards and management. IMF working paper 04/226 (2004)
39. McCallum B. Two fallacies concerning central bank independence. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings vol. 85 (1995) 207-211
40. Meade E., and Crowe C. Evolution in central bank governance around the world. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (2007) 69-90
41. Persson T., and Tabellini G. Designing institutions for monetary stability. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39 (1993) 53-84
42. Posen A. Declarations are not enough: financial sources of central bank independence. In: Bernanke B., and Rotemberg J.J. (Eds). NBER Macroeconomics Annual (1995), The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 251-278
43. In: Pringle R. (Ed). Central Bank Directory 2005 (2005), Central Banking Publications, London
44. Rasche R., and Williams M. The effectiveness of monetary policy. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review vol. 89 (2007) 447-490
45. Rogoff K. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (1985) 1169-1990
46. Reinhart C., and Rogoff K. The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: a reinterpretation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (2004) 1-48
47. Segolato J.-F., Sommer M., Arnone M., and Laurens B. Central bank independence: lessons from global trends. IMF working paper 07/88 (2007)
48. Sibert A. Central banking by committee. International Finance 9 (2006) 145-168
49. Siklos P. The Changing Face of Central Banking (2002), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass
50. Siklos, P., 2008. The wisdom of men versus rules: do central banks need governing principles? unpublished working paper.
51. Svensson L. Optimal inflation targets, 'conservative central banks and linear inflation targets. American Economic Review 85 (1997) 98-114
52. Temple J. Central bank independence and inflation: good news and bad news. Economics Letters 61 (1998) 215-219
53. Timmermann A. An evaluation of the world economic outlook forecasts. IMF working paper 06/59 (2006)
54. Vaubel R. The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: german and international evidence. European Journal of Political Economy 13 (1997) 201-224
55. Walsh C. Optimal contracts for central bankers. American Economic Review 85 (1995) 150-167
56. Woodford M. Interest and Prices (2003), Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.