Foreign exchange intervention and the political business cycle: A panel data analysis

Journal of International Money and Finance

Volumn 28, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 755-775

  Dreher, Axel ^a,b,c,d   Vaubel, Roland ^e  

^a Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3   (Germany)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

^c IZA ^*  (Germany)

^d KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^e UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Foreign exchange interventions; Political business cycles

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349229246     PISSN: 02615606     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2008.12.007     Document Type: Article

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