The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 201-224

  Vaubel, Roland ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Central banks; Political business cycles

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031138821     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00004-9     Document Type: Article

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