Goal independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 748-762

  Crowe, Christopher ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

C31; C72; Central bank independence; Coalition formation; D72; E31; E58; Inflation; Treatment effects

Indexed keywords

EID: 55049090945     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.05.002     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Bernhard W. A political explanation of variations in central bank independence. American Political Science Review 92 (1998) 311-327
2. Bernhard W., and Leblang W. Political parties and monetary commitments. International Organization 56 (2002) 803-830
3. Blinder A. What central bankers could learn from academics-and vice-versa. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (1997) 3-19
4. Bloch F. Noncooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In: Cararro C., and Siniscalco D. (Eds). New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment (1997), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
5. Bloch F. Sequential formation of coalitions with externalities and fixed payoff division. Games and Economic Behavior 14 (1996) 90-123
6. Bowles P., and White G. Central bank independence: a political economy approach. Journal of Development Studies 31 (1994) 235-264
7. Crowe C. Goal independent central banks: why politicians decide to delegate. IMF Working Paper 06/256 (2006), International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC
8. Debelle G., and Fischer S. How independent should a central bank be?. In: Fuhrer J. (Ed). Goals, Guidelines, and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers (1994), Federal Reserve Bank, Boston, MA
9. Demange G. Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures. Journal of Mathematical Economics 23 (1994) 45-58
10. Drazen A. Political Economy in Macroeconomics (2000), Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
11. Eggertsson G., and Le Borgne E. A political agency theory of central bank independence. IMF Working Paper 03/144 (2003), International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC
12. Eijffinger S., and de Haan J. The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence. Special Papers in International Economics vol. 19 (1996), International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
13. Fry M., Julius D., Mahadeva L., Roger S., and Sterne G. Key issues in the choice of monetary policy framework. 2000. In: Mahadeva, and Sterne (Eds). Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context (2000), Routledge, London
14. Goodhart C., and Meade E. Central Banks and Supreme Courts. Moneda y Crédito vol. 218 (2004), Fundacion Santander Central Hispano, Madrid
15. Goodman J. The politics of central bank independence. Comparative Politics 23 (1991) 329-349
16. Hayo B. Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability. European Journal of Political Economy 14 (1998) 241-263
17. Heston A., Summers R., and Aten B. Penn World Table Version 6.1 (2002), Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), Philadelphia, PA
18. Hillman A. The Political Economy of Protection (1989), Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur, Switzerland
19. Keefer P., and Stasavage D. The limits of delegation: veto players, central bank independence and the credibility of monetary policy. American Political Science Review, 97 (2003) 407-423
20. Levy G. A model of political parties. Journal of Economic Theory, 115 (2004) 250-277
21. Levy G. Endogenous Parties: Cooperative and Non-cooperative Analysis (2002), Department of Economics, London School of Economics
22. Lohmann S. Federalism and central bank independence: the politics of German monetary policy, 1957-92. World Politics, 50 (1998) 401-446
23. Maddala G. Limited-dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (1983), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
24. Marshall M., and Jaggers K. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-1999. University of Maryland Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, College Park, MD (2001). http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
25. Milesi-Ferretti G.-M. Wage indexation and time inconsistency. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26 (1994) 941-950
26. Moser P. Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence. European Economic Review, 43 (1999) 1569-1593
27. Osborne M., and Rubinstein A. A Course in Game Theory (1994), The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
28. Persson T., and Tabellini G. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (2000), The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
29. Posen A. Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics. In: O'Brien R. (Ed). Finance and the International Economy vol. 7 (1993), Oxford University Press, Oxford
30. Ray D., and Vohra R. A theory of endogenous coalition structures. Games and Economic Behavior, 26 (1999) 286-336
31. Rogoff K. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985) 1169-1190
32. Walsh C. Optimal contracts for central bankers. American Economic Review, 85 (1995) 150-167
33. Wooley J. Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy (1984), Cambridge University Press, London
34. World Values Survey (1995-1997). Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
35. World Values Survey (1990-1991). Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.