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Volumn 75, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 17-34

Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory

Author keywords

Anonymity; Laboratory experiments; Prosocial behavior; Scrutiny

Indexed keywords


EID: 84859886196     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.003     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (50)

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