Collective reputation, social norms, and participation

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 94, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 763-785

  Saak, Alexander E ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective reputation; Free riding; Peer monitoring; Peer sanction; Public monitoring

Indexed keywords

FOOD AVAILABILITY; FOOD SECURITY; GAME THEORY; MONITORING; NUMERICAL MODEL;

EID: 84859186873     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: 14678276     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aar154     Document Type: Article

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