Firm reputation and horizontal integration

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 340-363

  Cai, Hongbin ^a   Obara, Ichiro ^b  

^a Peking University   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350139576     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00068.x     Document Type: Article

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