The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 121-134

  Pecorino, Paul ^a  

^a U ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; H41; Public goods; Repeated game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038127469     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00091-7     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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