Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-15

  Kandori, Michihiro ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036170128     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2853     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Information and timing in repeated partnerships
2. Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring
3. Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
4. Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
5. Commitment and observability in games
6. Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
7. Moral hazard and private monitoring
8. Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
9. Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
10. On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
11. On sustaining cooperation without public observations
12. Games with imperfectly observable commitment
13. Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching
14. Correlated equilibrium and private monitoring
15. A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
16. Notes on private monitoring with nonvanishing noise
17. An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
18. The folk theorem with imperfect public information
19. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information
20. Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information
21. Cooperation in finitely repeated games with imperfect private information, mimeo
22. Social norms and community enforcement
23. "Check Your Partner's Behavior by Randomization: New Efficiency Results on Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring"
24. Private observation, communication and collusion
25. Efficiency in repeated games revisited: The role of private strategies
26. Nash equilibria of n-player repeated games with semi-standard information
27. "Private Strategies in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring"
28. Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
29. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability"
30. Private strategy and efficiency: Repeated partnership game revisited
31. The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
32. Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting
33. Efficiency in the prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
34. Robustness of efficient equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
35. "Existence of Nontrivial Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring"