Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2002, Pages

  Che, Yeon Koo ^a  

^a University of Wisconsin   (United States)

Author keywords

and peer monitoring; free riding; Group lending

Indexed keywords

EID: 85108908428     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351704     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1016     Document Type: Article

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