Group reputations: An experimental foray

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 73, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 153-157

  Huck, Steffen ^a   Lünser, Gabriele K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Group reputations; Information conditions; Moral hazard; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 74749087258     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.001     Document Type: Article

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