Social relations and cooperation in organizations

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-25

  Spagnolo, Giancarlo ^a,b  

^a CHURCHILL COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Community enforcement; Cooperation; D20; Embeddedness; J50; L23; M12; Norms; O17; Peer monitoring; Peer pressure; Prisoner's Dilemma; Q20; Reputation spillovers; Social capital; Teams; Trust; X efficiency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002303376     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00119-x     Document Type: Article

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