A generalization of Hamilton's rule-Love others how much?

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 299, Issue , 2012, Pages 42-54

  Alger, Ingela ^a   Weibull, Jörgen W ^b,c,d  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^c ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

^d ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

Author keywords

Altruism; Cooperation; Evolutionary stability; Hamilton's rule; Spite

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; FITNESS; NATURAL SELECTION;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; ASSORTATIVE MATING; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GENETIC REASSORTMENT; HAMILTON RULE; HERITABILITY; KIN SELECTION; MATHEMATICAL PARAMETERS; METHODOLOGY; NATURAL SELECTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REPRODUCTIVE FITNESS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL EVOLUTION; SOCIAL INTERACTION; THEORETICAL MODEL;

ALTRUISM; ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; LOVE; MODELS, GENETIC; QUANTITATIVE TRAIT, HERITABLE; SELECTION, GENETIC;

EID: 84857915836     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.05.008     Document Type: Article

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