Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 247, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 11-22

  André, Jean Baptiste ^a,b   Day, Troy ^a  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b INSTITUTO GULBENKIAN DE CIÊNCIA   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Continuous prisoner's dilemma; Game theory; Iterated game; Negotiation; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; NATURAL SELECTION; PRISONER DILEMMA; RECIPROCITY;

ANALYTIC METHOD; ARTICLE; BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM; GAME; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL ASPECT; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, GENETIC; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; SELECTION (GENETICS); SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 34248635406     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.02.007     Document Type: Article

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