What to maximize if you must

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 133, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 31-57

  Heifetz, Aviad ^a   Shannon, Chris ^b   Spiegel, Yossi ^c  

^a OPEN UNIVERSITY OF ISRAEL   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Evolution of preferences; Evolutionary stability; Interdependent preferences; Overconfidence

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847036774     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.013     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. D. Acemoglu, M. Yildiz, Evolution of perceptions and play, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, Mimeo.
2. Alchian A. Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory. J. Polit. Economy 58 (1950) 211-221
3. Anderson R.M., and Zame W.R. Genericity with infinitely many parameters. Advances Theoretical Econ. 1 (2001) 1-62
4. Benos A.V. Aggressiveness and survival of overconfident traders. J. Finan. Markets 1 (1998) 353-383
5. N. Bergman, Y. Bergman, Ecologies of preferences with envy as an antidote to risk-aversion in bargaining, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000, Mimeo.
6. Bester H., and Güth W. Is altruism evolutionary stable?. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 34 2 (1998) 211-221
7. Bolle F. Is altruism evolutionarily stable? And envy and malevolence?-Remarks on Bester and Güth. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 42 1 (2000) 131-133
8. J.P.R. Christensen, Topology and borel structure, North Holland Mathematical Studies, vol. 10, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1974.
9. E. Dekel, J. Ely, O. Yilankaya, Evolution of preferences, Northwestern University, 1998, Mimeo.
10. Dubey P. Inefficiency of Nash equilibria. Mathematics Operations Res. 11 1 (1986) 1-8
11. Ely J., and Yilankaya O. Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences. J. Econ. Theory 97 2 (2001) 255-272
12. C. Fershtman, A. Heifetz, Read my lips, watch for leaps: a theory of endogenous political instability, Foerder Working Paper 8-02, Tel Aviv University, 2002.
13. Fershtman C., and Judd K. Incentive equilibrium in oligopoly. Amer. Econ. Rev. 77 5 (1987) 927-940
14. Fershtman C., Judd K., and Kalai E. Observable contracts: strategic delegation and cooperation. Int. Econ. Rev. 32 3 (1991) 551-559
15. Fershtman C., and Weiss Y. Why do we care about what others think about us?. In: Ben Ner A., and Putterman L. (Eds). Economics, Values and Organization (1997), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA
16. Fershtman C., and Weiss Y. Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences. J. Public Econ. 70 (1998) 53-74
17. Frank R. If homo economicus could choose his own utility function, would he choose one with a conscience?. Amer. Econ. Rev. 77 4 (1987) 593-604
18. Frank R. Passions within Reason-The Strategic Role of the Emotions (1988), W.W. Norton & Company, New York
19. Friedman M. Essays in Positive Economics (1953), University of Chicago Press
20. Fudenberg D., and Levine D. The Theory of Learning in Games (1998), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
21. Golubitsky M., and Guillemin V. Stable Mappings and Their Singularities (1973), Springer, New York
22. Green J. Commitment with third parties. Ann. Econ. Statist. 25-26 (1992) 101-121
23. Güth W., and Peleg B. When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis. J. Evolutionary Econ. 11 (2001) 479-499
24. Güth W., and Yaari M. Explaining reciprocal behavior in simple strategic games: an evolutionary approach. In: Witt U. (Ed). Explaining Forces and Changes: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics (1992), University of Michigan Press
25. Guttman J.M. On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity. Europ. J. Polit. Econ. 16 (2000) 31-50
26. Heifetz A., and Segev E. The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining. Games Econ. Behav. 49 (2004) 117-134
27. A. Heifetz, A., E. Segev, E. Talley, Market design with endogenous preferences, 2004, Mimeo.
28. A. Heifetz, C. Shannon, Y. Spiegel, What to maximize if you must, CORE Discussion Paper 2003/47, 2003.
29. A. Heifetz, C. Shannon, Y. Spiegel, The dynamic evolution of dispositions, 2004, Mimeo.
30. Hirsch M. Differential Topology (1976), Springer, New York
31. Huck S., and Oechssler J. The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations. Games Econ. Behav. 28 (1999) 13-24
32. Hunt B.R., Sauer T., and Yorke J.A. Prevalence: a translation-invariant 'almost every' on infinite-dimensional spaces. Bull. (New Series) Amer. Math. Society 27 (1992) 217-238
33. Katz M. Game-playing agents: unobservable contracts as precommitments. RAND J. Econ. 22 (1991) 307-328
34. Koçkesen L., Ok E.A., and Sethi R. Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games. Games Econ. Behav. 31 (2000) 303-310
35. Koçkesen L., Ok E.A., and Sethi R. The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences. J. Econ. Theory 92 (2000) 274-299
36. Kreps D., and Wilson R. Reputation and imperfect information. J. Econ. Theory 27 (1982) 253-279
37. Kyle A.S., and Wang A. Speculation duopoly with agreement to disagree: can overconfidence survive the market test?. J. Finance LII (1997) 2073-2090
38. Leininger W., Linhart P.B., and Radner R. Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information. J. Econ. Theory 48 (1989) 63-106
39. Milgrom P., and Roberts J. Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence. J. Econ. Theory 27 (1982) 280-312
40. Oechssler J., and Riedel F. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17 (2001) 141-162
41. Ok E.A., and Vega-Redondo F. On the evolution of individualistic preferences: an incomplete information scenario. J. Econ. Theory 97 (2001) 231-254
42. Possajennikov A. On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 42 1 (2000) 125-129
43. Rotemberg J.J. Human relation in the workplace. J. Polit. Econ. 102 (1994) 684-717
44. Samuelson L. Introduction to the evolution of preferences. J. Econ. Theory 97 (2001) 225-230
45. Sandroni A. Do markets favor agents able to make accurate predictions. Econometrica 68 (2000) 1303-1341
46. Schelling T. The Strategy of Conflict (1960), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
47. Sethi R., and Somanathan E. Preference evolution and reciprocity. J. Econ. Theory 97 (2001) 273-297
48. von Stackelberg H. Marktform und Gleichgewicht (1934), Springer, Vienna, Berlin