The dynamic evolution of preferences

Economic Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 251-286

  Heifetz, Aviad ^a   Shannon, Chris ^b   Spiegel, Yossi ^c  

^a OPEN UNIVERSITY OF ISRAEL   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Evolution of preferences; Evolutionary stability; Interdependent preferences; Overconfidence

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249708976     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7     Document Type: Article

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