Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 817-832

  Berger, Helge ^a,d   Nitsch, Volker ^a,b,d   Lybek, Tonny ^c  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^c INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^d CESifo ^*  (Germany)

Author keywords

Committee; Council; Decision making; E52; E58; E61; Governance; Monetary policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 55049106047     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.04.003     Document Type: Article

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