International and domestic constraints on political business cycles in OECD economies

International Organization

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 87-120

  Clark, William Roberts ^a   Reichert, Usha Nair ^a   Lomas, Sandra Lynn ^a   Parker, Kevin L ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032330786     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081898550563     Document Type: Review

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