The political economy of fixed exchange rate regimes: The experience of post-communist countries

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 248-264

  Bodea, Cristina ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Credibility; Democratization; Fixed exchange rate; Partisanship; Post communist; Realignment

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952293185     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.12.005     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Alesina A., Roubini N., Cohen G.D. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy 1997, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
2. Baek I. The determinants of the survival of realigned exchange rate arrangements in emerging economies. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 2001, 41:461-475.
3. Barro R., Gordon D. A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model. The Journal of Political Economy 1983, 91:589-610.
4. Beblavy M. Exchange rate and exchange rate regime in Slovakia. Recent developments. International Center for Economic Growth Working Paper No. 5, Bratislava, Slovakia 2002.
5. Blazyca G., Rapacki R. Continuity and change in Polish economic policy: the impact of the 1993 election. Europe-Asia Studies 1996, 48:85-100.
6. Bloomberg S.B., Frieden J., Stein E. Sustaining fixed rates: the political economy of currency pegs in Latin America. Journal of Applied Economics 2005, VIII:203-225.
7. Box-Steffensmeier J.M., Jones B.J. Timing and Political Change: Event History Modeling in Political Science 2002, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
8. Broz L.J. Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes. International Organization 2002, 56:861-888.
9. Brune, N., 2006. Financial liberalization, reputation building and the IMF. Unpublished working Paper.
10. Canavan C., Tommasi M. On the credibility of alternative exchange rate regimes. Journal of Development Economics 1997, 54:101-122.
11. Collins S.M. On becoming more flexible: exchange rate regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean. Journal of Development Economics 1996, 51:117-138.
12. Cooper R. Currency devaluations in developing countries. Essays in International Finance 86 1971, Princeton University.
13. Cottarelli C., Giannini C. Credibility without rules? Monetary frameworks in post-Bretton Woods era. Temi di Discussione del Servizio Studi, Banca D'Italia, 312 1997.
14. Cukierman A., Miller G.P., Neyapti B. Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies - an international perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics 2002, 49:237-264.
15. Edin P.A., Vredin A. Devaluation risk in target zones: evidence from the Nordic countries. The Economic Journal 1993, 103:161-175.
16. Edwards S. Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and Adjustment: Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries 1989, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
17. Edwards S., Montiel P. Devaluation crises and macroeconomic consequences of postponed adjustment in developing countries. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 1989, 36:875-903.
18. Egert B., Halpern L., MacDonald R. Equilibrium exchange rates in transition economies: taking stock of the issues. Journal of Economic Surveys 2006, 20:257-324.
19. Eichengreen B., Rose A., Wyplosz C. Contagious currency crises. CEPR Discussion Paper 1453. Center for Economic Policy Research 1996.
20. Frankel J. Contractionary currency crashes in developing countries. NBER Working Paper 11508 2005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA.
21. Frankel J., Rose A. Currency crashes in emerging markets: an empirical treatment. Journal of International Economics 1996, 41:351-366.
22. Frankel J., Schmukler S., Serven L. Verifiability and the vanishing intermediate exchange rate regime. NBER Working Paper 7901 2000, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA.
23. Frieden J. Real sources of European currency policy: sectoral interests and European monetary integration. International Organization 2002, 56:831-860.
24. Frye T. The perils of polarization. Economic performance in the post communist world. World Politics 2002, 54:308-337.
25. Giavazzi F., Pagano M. The advantage of tying one's hands: EMS discipline and central bank credibility. European Economic Review 1988, 32:1055-1082.
26. Global Financial Data: http://www.globalfinancialdata.com/.
27. Grzymala-Busse A.M. Redeeming the Communist Past 2002, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
28. Hajnovic F. Towards a pattern of the inflation process in Slovakia 2001, Institute of Monetary and Financial Studies, National Bank of Slovakia.
29. Halpern L., Wyplosz C. Equilibrium exchange rate in transition economies. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 1997, 44:430-461.
30. Healy C. Sustaining an exchange rate fix: an integrated approach to understanding survival. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, September 2-5 2004.
31. Herrendorf B. Transparency, reputation, and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates. Journal of International Economics 1999, 49:31-50.
32. Hibbs D. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 1977, 7:1467-1487.
33. Horvath J., Jonas J. Exchange rate regimes in the transition economies: case study of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997. ZEI Working Paper, B98-11 1998.
34. International Monetary Fund. Exchange Rate Agreements and Restrictions Annual Report. 1990-1999.
35. Ipsen E. Can devaluation cure Europe's slump?. International Herald Tribune January 8, 1992 1992, Accessed at http://www.iht.com/articles/1992/01/08/deva.php.
36. Kaminski G., Reinhart C.M. The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems. International Finance Discussion Paper 544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US) 1996.
37. Kaminski G., Lizondo S., Reinhart C.M. Leading indicators of currency crises. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 45 1998.
38. Klein M.W., Marion N.P. Explaining the duration of exchange rate pegs. Journal of Development Economics 1997, 54:387-404.
39. Kocenda E. Exchange Rate in Transition 1998, CERGE Manuscript, Prague.
40. Krugman P. A model of balance of payments crisis. Journal of Money Credit and Banking 1979, 11:311-325.
41. Kydland F., Prescott E. Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans. The Journal of Political Economy 1977, 85:473-492.
42. Levy-Yeyati E., Sturzeneger F. To float or to fix: evidence on the impact of exchange rate regimes on growth. American Economic Review 2003, 93:1173-1193.
43. Leiderman L., Svensson L.E.O. Inflation Targets 1995, Center for Economic Policy Research, London.
44. Lohmann S. Optimal commitment in monetary policy: credibility versus flexibility. American Economic Review 1992, 82:273-286.
45. Matousek R. Transparency and credibility of monetary policy in transition countries: the case of the Czech Republic. Czech National Bank Working Paper 37 2001.
46. McKinnon R. Optimum currency areas. The American Economic Review 1963, 53:717-725.
47. Milesi-Ferretti G.M. The disadvantage of tying their hands: on the political economy of policy commitments. Economic Journal 1995, 105:1381-1402.
48. Mundell R. A theory of optimum currency areas. American Economic Review 1961, 51:655-667.
49. National Bank of Hungary. 1999. Annual Report.
50. National Bank of Poland. Annual Report. 1997-1998.
51. Nuti D. The Polish Zloty 1990-1999: success and under-performance. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 2000.
52. Poirson H. How do countries choose their exchange rate regime?. International Monetary Fund Working Paper 01/46 2001.
53. Popova, K., 2000. Independent central banks versus currency boards: credible commitments and inflationary performance. University of Rochester Unpublished Manuscript.
54. Powell B.G., Witten G.D. A cross national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the political context. American Journal of Political Science 1993, 37:391-414.
55. Quinn D.P., Inclan C. The origins of financial openness: a study of current and capital account liberalization. American Journal of Political Science 1997, 41:771-813.
56. Rogoff K.S. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1985, 100:1169-1190.
57. Reinhart C.M., Rogoff K.S. The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: a reinterpretation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2004, 119:1-48.
58. Simmons B. Who Adjusts? 1994, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
59. Stone R. Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition 2002, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
60. Tomz M., Wittenberg J., King G. Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.1 2003, Stanford University, University of Wisconsin, and Harvard University.
61. Valachy J., Kocenda E. Exchange rate regimes and volatility: comparison of the snake and Visegrad. William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 622 2003.
62. Von Hagen J., Zhou J. De facto and official exchange rate regimes in transition economies. ZEI Working Paper May 2002 2002.
63. Von Hagen J., Zhou J. The choice of exchange rate regimes in developing countries: a multinomial panel analysis. Journal of International Money and Finance 2007, 26:1071-1094.
64. Walker R. Multiple choice: substitution and complementarity in policy choice with heterogeneity 2005, Unpublished Dissertation, University of Rochester.