The political economy of international monetary relations

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 4, Issue , 2001, Pages 317-343

  Broz, J Lawrence ^a   Frieden, Jeffry A ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Currency policy; Exchange rates; International capital mobility; Monetary policy; Monetary regimes

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035649613     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.317     Document Type: Article

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