Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 763-777

  Crowe, Christopher ^a   Meade, Ellen E ^b  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Monetary policy; Transparency

Indexed keywords

EID: 55049138280     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.06.004     Document Type: Article

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