Blockholder dispersion and firm value

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1330-1339

  Konijn, Sander J J ^a   Kräussl, Roman ^b   Lucas, Andre ^b,c  

^a ING Bank ^*  (Netherlands)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c TINBERGEN INSTITUTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Firm value; Multiple blockholder structures; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051592145     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.005     Document Type: Article

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