The "wall Street Walk" and shareholder activism: Exit as a form of voice

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 7, 2009, Pages 2645-2685

  Admati, Anat R ^a   Pfleiderer, Paul ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

D53; D82; G10; G30; G34

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958553209     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhp037     Document Type: Article

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