Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 84, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 330-357

  Fan, Joseph P H ^a   Wong, T J ^a   Zhang, Tianyu ^b  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

China; Corporate governance; IPO performance; Partial privatization; Political connections

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247262521     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.008     Document Type: Article

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