Relative performance evaluation and related peer groups in executive compensation contracts

Accounting Review

Volumn 86, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 1007-1043

  Gong, Guojin ^a   Li, Laura Yue ^b   Shin, Jae Yong ^c  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^c Seoul National University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Peer group; Relative performance evaluation; SEC regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 79958134659     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.00000042     Document Type: Article

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