Discretion in financial reporting: The voluntary disclosure of compensation peer groups in proxy statement performance graphs

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 25-52

  Byrd, John W ^a   Johnson, Mailyn F ^b   Porter, Susan L ^c  

^a FORT LEWIS COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003148220     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1998.tb00548.x     Document Type: Article

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