An empirical analysis of an incentive plan with relative performance measures: Evidence from a postal service

Accounting Review

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 533-566

  Matsumura, Ella Mae ^a   Shin, Jae Yong ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Degree of common uncertainty; Incentive plan; Perceived unfairness; Relative performance measures

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745322373     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2006.81.3.533     Document Type: Review

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