Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models

Public Choice

Volumn 123, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 59-93

  Hausken, Kjell ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22544461899     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-1717-3     Document Type: Article

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