The shield that never was: Societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control

Information and Computation

Volumn 209, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 89-107

  Faliszewski, Piotr ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^c   Rothe, Jörg ^d  

^a AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^b Rochester Institute of Technology   (United States)

^c University of Rochester   (United States)

^d HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Algorithms; Complexity theory; Computational social choice; Control and manipulation of elections; Multiagent systems; Preference aggregation

Indexed keywords

CASE HARDNESS; COMPLEXITY THEORY; NP-HARD; NP-HARDNESS; POLITICAL SCIENCE; PREFERENCE AGGREGATIONS; SOCIAL CHOICE; SOCIETAL PREFERENCES;

ALGORITHMS; DECISION THEORY; HARDNESS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

EID: 78649580555     PISSN: 08905401     EISSN: 10902651     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ic.2010.09.001     Document Type: Article

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