Single-peaked consistency and its complexity

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

Volumn 178, Issue , 2008, Pages 366-370

  Escoffier, Bruno ^a   Lang, Jérôme ^b   Öztürk, Meltem ^c  

^a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PAUL SABATIER   (France)

^c UNIVERSITÉ D'ARTOIS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY; PREFERENCE AGGREGATIONS;

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS;

EID: 85019938304     PISSN: 09226389     EISSN: 18798314     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.3233/978-1-58603-891-5-366     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (9)

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3. Marquis de Condorcet, Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la proba-bilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, Imprimerie Royale, Paris, 1785.
4. V. Conitzer, ‘Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries’, in Proceedings of AAMAS-07, pp. 408–415, (2007).
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6. W. Gehrlein, ‘Condorcet’s paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences’, Theory and Decision, 52(2), 171–199, (2002).
7. A. Gibbard, ‘Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result’, Econo-metrica, 41, 587–601, (1973).
8. M.A. Satterthwaite, ‘Strategy proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions’, Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 187–217, (1975).
9. M. Trick, ‘Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree’, Mathematical Social Sciences, 17(1), 329–334, (1989).