Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 381-387

  Peleg, Bezalel ^a   Sudhölter, Peter ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Coalition proof equilibrium; Generalized median voter scheme; Single peaked preference

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745820201     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050043     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Arrow, K.J. (1951) Social Choice and Individual values, Wiley, New York
2. Barberá, S., Gul, F., Stacchetti, E. (1993) Generalized median voter schemes and committees. Journal of Economic Theory 61: 262-289
3. Barberá, S., Sonnenschein, H., Zhou, L. (1991) Voting by committees. Econometrica 59: 595-609
4. Bernheim, B.D., Peleg, B., Whinston, M.D. (1987) Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I. Concepts. Journal of Economic Theory 42: 1-12
5. Black, D. (1948) On the rationale of group decision making. Journal of Political Economy 56: 23-34
6. Border, K., Jordan, J. (1983) Straightforward elections, unanimity, and phantom voters. Review of economic Studies 50: 153-170
7. Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., Maskin, E. (1979) The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility. The Review of Economic Studies 46: 185-216
8. Kaplan, G. (1992) Sophisticated outcomes and coalitional stability. M.Sc. Thesis, Department of Statistics, Tel-Aviv University (in English)
9. Moulin, H. (1980) On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness. Public Choice 35: 437-455
10. Peleg, B. (1998) Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof. Economic Letters 60: 157-162