Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 715-722

  Brandt, Felix ^a   Brill, Markus ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b Rochester Institute of Technology   (United States)

^c University of Rochester   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

ELECTION SYSTEMS; NP-HARD; P-COMPLETE; POLITICAL SCIENCE; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; RICH STRUCTURE;

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EID: 77958568339     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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