Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity

American Economic Review

Volumn 88, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 902-932

  Bernheim, B Douglas ^a   Whinston, Michael D ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042578958     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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