Contract renegotiation and options in agency problems

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 395-423

  Edlin, Aaron S ^a   Hermalin, Benjamin E ^b  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034364683     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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