Contracting on time

American Economic Review

Volumn 95, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 1369-1385

  Guriev, Sergei ^a   Kvasov, Dmitriy ^b  

^a NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL   (Russian Federation)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645740896     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282805775014452     Document Type: Review

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