Buyer-option contracts restored: Renegotiation, inefficient threats, and the hold-up problem

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 148-169

  Lyon, Thomas P ^a   Rasmusen, Eric ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344665595     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewh027     Document Type: Review

References (26)

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