The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action

American Sociological Review

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 250-277

  Heckathorn, Douglas D ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b Department of Sociology ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; LOCAL PARTICIPATION; PLANNING THEORY; PRISONER'S DILEMMA; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0029837509     PISSN: 00031224     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2096334     Document Type: Article

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