When does "economic man" dominate social behavior?

Science

Volumn 311, Issue 5757, 2006, Pages 47-52

  Camerer, Colin F ^a   Fehr, Ernst ^b,c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^c Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Collegium Helveticum   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

ECONOMIC THEORY; SELF-REGARDING PEOPLE; SOCIAL INTERACTIONS;

SOCIAL ASPECTS;

SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

COOPERATION; ECONOMIC ASPECT; GAME; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REVIEW; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL INTERACTION; STATISTICAL MODEL; THEORY;

COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; FORECASTING; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INVESTMENTS; MODELS, ECONOMIC; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MOTIVATION; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; THINKING;

EID: 30344473631     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: 10959203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1110600     Document Type: Review

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51. C.F.C. gratefully acknowledges support from the Human Frontier Science Program and N5F (grant SE5 000376) grants to Caltech. E.F. gratefully acknowledges support from the Research Priority Program of the University of Zurich on the "Foundations of Human Social Behavior" and the Collegium Helveticum.